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iabilIty:
.eg islation?

0I
James D. Ghiardi
The current mood of the country
reflects the desire for government action by local and state units. "Get the
feds out" appears to be the call of the
1980s. Disillusionment with Washington solutions is prevalent, particularly
in the business community. Therefore, it is completely incomprehensible that a segment of the business
community is looking to the federal
government for relief in the area of
product liability.
Product liability is being touted as a
national problem that demands a national solution. This Alice in Wonderland approach by "big" business and

trade associations is utopian at best.
Since when can Washington provide a
solution that is fair and equitable to
the majority of citizens in the 50
states? Washington's "wonder cures,"
epitomized by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),I
Black Lung Legislation,' the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),3 and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, 4 to mention only a few, depict a dismal record
of success.
For more than a decade, Congress
struggled with legislation intended to
usurp the power of the states over
automobile liability issues. Millions of
dollars were spent, millions of pages of
testimony were recorded, but the
burning liability issue of the late 1960s
was allowed eventually to become dormant and left to the states. The states
have handled the issue of automobile
liability in many ways, some by legislation, others by common law. No one
solution was determined to be the
best. Each state has been able to deal
fairly with the problem in the best in-

terest of its citizens and no calamity
has fallen on the land because the
"tablets" were not delivered from "on
high"-the federal government.
The federal government has performed a valuable service by promulgating a model product liability
act' and adopting legislation allowing
manufacturers to self-insure. 6 However, federal legislation that would
usurp the legislation and common law
of the states is unwarranted and unwise. It would merely create an absolute legal morass for American
business and consumers.
The development of tort law has
traditionally been an area reserved exclusively to the states. Any reform required in the tort law of products
should occur at the state level. Each
state should be allowed to develop the
law to meet its own particular concerns and problems.

Uniformity and certainty
Supporters of a federal product law
base their argument on the lack of
consistency among the various state

approaches to product liability law.
But the basic premise that a federal
law will bring stability to the area is
unfounded. On the contrary, such
legislation would create more inconsistency and uncertainty than now exists. The imposition of a federal product law would create uncertainty in
jurisdictions that now have stable and
well-developed product law.

Constitutionality
One factor in the application of a
federal law that would create instability is the inevitable litigation
over its constitutionality. There would
be nationwide constitutional challenges to both the legislation as a
whole and to particular provisions.
Because of the unprecedented withdrawal of a state's power to develop its
own tort law there would be numerous
challenges to the power of the federal
government to legislate tort law for
the states. Such an invasion of state
sovereignty raises serious separation of
powers questions. Further, an equal
protection issue is raised as to any constitutionally valid rationale for the
preemption of only a part of state tort
law while leaving the rest intact.
Constitutional challenges also
would be made to the validity of particular provisions of a federal product
liability statute. A good example is the

statute of repose that is part of the
present Senate working draft of a
federal product liability statute.'
Statutes of repose already are constitutionally questionable at the state
level.8 To impose a national statute of
repose applicable to all product actions would be met with serious and
constant challenge.
This inevitable constitutional litigation would result in uncertainty as
to whether the federal legislation
would apply to a given jurisdiction.
Courts finding all or part of thestatute
to be unconstitutional would then
resort back to state law. An anomalous situation would develop in that
some jurisdictions would be relying on
federal law while others would continue to apply state product law. It
would be years before the constitutionality of the law would be decisively
determined by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Further, if the legislation, or
parts of it, were found to be unconstitutional, courts would be required
to retrieve their state law after years of
litigation under the federal law.

Judicial interpretation
Another factor that would defeat
the goal of uniformity is the differing
judicial interpretations that would be
given to the same statutory language.
The draft now being considered by
the Senate gives jurisdiction over this
"federal" law to the state courts. 9 It is
not unlikely that such a situation
would result in 50 different interpretations of the same provision by 50
different state courts. Each state
would develop its own unique interpretation of the law with the bare
statutory language as the only common factor. Thousands of trial courts,
hundreds of intermediate appellate
courts and, finally, the 50 highest appellate courts would struggle with interpreting the less than precise federal
legislation developed through the less
than artful legislative process.
A related problem would be the
varying treatment of areas not covered by the statute. It is impossible to
codify product law to deal with every
situation that gives rise to litigation.
The question becomes how the state
courts are to fill in gaps in the legislation. Because it does not appear to be
constitutionally permissible to make
decisions of one state court binding on
a court in a different state, it is assumed that each jurisdiction would
follow existing law or create new law

to fill in the holes. It is clear that inconsistency would result from such a
patchwork of state court decisions.
The result of this state implementation of "federal" law would be even
greater instability in the law than now
exists. Despite the present diversity in
product law, each jurisdiction has its
own body of law that can be identified
and used to predict the law under new
situations. However, a federal statute
would require the wholesale junking
of this law without any prior evaluation of its effectiveness. The courts in
each state would be writing on a clean
slate with only bare statutory language as a common factor. Any predictability and stability that had been
established previously would be
destroyed and replaced with a federal
law of very uncertain application.
Federal legislation, in an area reserved to the states, would result in a
tremendous waste of court time relitigating issues previously settled in the
particular jurisdiction at a horrendous cost to the consuming public in
both dollars and uncertainty.
Rather than curbing judicial activism, heralded as the cause of many
of the problems in product law, the
judiciary would no longer be constrained in any way by established
precedent, but would be free to decide
the law on the basis of the "length of
the chancellor's foot." It is readily apparent that it would be even more difficult for manufacturers and consumers to determine their respective
rights and responsibilities. Rather
than bringing stability to the law, such
a statute would foster even greater unpredictability and inconsistency.
The same problems would exist if
the already overburdened federal
courts were given jurisdiction over
cases falling within the purview of the
statute. Different circuits would
disagree on the meaning and application of any particular provision.
Unless and until the Supreme Court
decisively interpreted each provision
there would be no consistency in the
law. While it is clearly undesirable to
inundate the Supreme Court with
product litigation, without one court
having the final word as to the interpretation of such a statute any degree
of uniformity is clearly unattainable.
Further, the federal courts also
would have the same problems as the
state courts in filling in the areas not
addressed by the legislation. Should
they apply state law, under the Erie

doctrine,' 0 that would have applied in
the absence of federal preemption,
should they look to decisions of other
federal courts or should they create an
entirely new federal tort law?
It is clear that the uniformity and
stability that a federal law would
create is more myth than reality.

What road to take?
Even if a federal law could establish
the desired uniformity, how is it to be
determined which single system will
be the most effective in accomplishing
the needed reform? A federal product
law would require important policy
decisions to be made at a national
level ignoring very real distinctions
between the states. Those decisions
would clearly impinge on areas of particular state concern and expertise.
Many policy issues arise, but this article deals with only a few.

Comparative negligence
A good example is the inclusion in
the Senate working draft of a "pure"
comparative negligence section."' A
number of jurisdictions still adhere to
the rule that contributory negligence
on the part of a person seeking
recovery in tort actions completely
bars recovery.12 Other states have
adopted, either legislatively or
judicially, a modified form of comparative negligence. 3 There are good
arguments for each approach based
on each state's local needs. But the
proposed law would require all jurisdictions to allow a plaintiff who is
found to be 99 percent negligent to
recover against a defendant who is
only 1 percent negligent. This is contrary to the position taken in a majority of jurisdictions. 4 The determination of whether to abolish or modify
contributory negligence as a defense
in a tort action is a matter of local concern and policy.
Further, the statute does not deal
with the many issues that are intricately related to the operation of a comparative negligence statute. States applying some form of comparative
negligence have spent years interpreting and refining their comparative negligence law as an integral
part of their tort law. Each state has
different rules as to joinder, defenses,
releases, settlements, setoffs, contribution and indemnity. The problems that arise in multiparty suits
when comparative negligence is ap-

plied cannot possibly be dealt with on
a national level.
The federal government has
neither the power nor the ability to
override the individual wisdom of
each state in determining whether
comparative negligence, or what form
of it, should be part of its tort system.
Another area of special local concern is the imposition of punitive
damages in product liability action.
Many states have recently come to
grips with this issue and reached different conclusions."B Whether punitive damages are to be allowed in
product cases or any other civil action
is a matter of state policy. It is an unwarranted invasion of state autonomy
to legisiate for or against punitive
damages on a federal level.
The form of statute of limitations to
be applied in product cases is also an
area best left to the states. The Senate
draft contains a national statute of
limitations which includes both a
statute of repose and a discovery
rule. 16 The states have taken very different approaches to such statutes. It

is inappropriate for the federal
government to legislate a national
statute of limitations.

A dual system
Another problem posed by federal
product legislation is the creation of a
dual tort system in the states. The
states would be required to apply a
federal statute in product actions
while applying state law in other tort
actions. Litigants in various tort actions would be treated differently
based on policy decisions made in
Washington. In a jurisdiction which
does not apply comparative negligence, litigants in a negligence action involving a product would be subject to comparative fault apportionment, while litigants in all other negligence actions would be subject to the
contributory negligence defense.
The adoption of federal product
legislation would also result in the application of a dual set of tort rules in
the same action in many cases. An example is an automobile accident in

which the plaintiff joins both the
negligent driver and the manufacturer of the allegedly defective product. Different rules, such as the limitations period, the availability of punitive damages and contributory negligence would be applied in the same
action. One defendant would be subject to the federal comparative negligence statute while the other defendant may have the benefit of a contributory negligence defense.
The impracticality and inequity of
such a situation is obvious. If a dual
system is required to establish stable
product law, it should be done at the
state level, where the practical, procedural and evidentiary issues can also
be considered.

A national legal nightmare?
Federal product liability legislation
would create more uncertainty and
inconsistency than now exists. Any
reform needed in product liability law
should be dealt with at the state level.
Twenty-six states have enacted some
form of product liability legislation 7
and many others have bills pending in
their legislatures. Other states have
highly developed and entrenched
product liability common law. These
legislative and judicial decisions
reflect the political, social, economic
and geographical realities in each
state.
It is inappropriate for the federal
government to intervene in the face of
these state reform attempts. The
states have traditionally been, and
should continue to be, laboratories for
innovation and experimentation. The
best reform can be accomplished by

allowing the states to draw from the
experience of other states and adopt
product law to meet their own needs.
They can readily reform their law as
needed. Federal law would ignore the
real distinctions that exist between the
states and could create a national
legal nightmare not readily changed
or reformed.
All the states do not encounter the
same product liability law problems.
While federal law may affect needed
reform in one state, it would destroy a
system that is working well in another
state. Each individual legislature and
judiciary is in a better position to
judge the problems that exist in its
own state and develop laws which
solve those problems while retaining
the best parts of existing law.
Responsible reform on a state-bystate basis would allow action based
on real experience and local concerns,
rather than speculation at the federal
level. Federal product legislation is an
inappropriate and unwarranted invasion of state power, denying the states
the opportunity to develop product
law that best meets the economic and
legal needs of their own citizens.
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